Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts
Herbert von Dirksen (1882-1955) and Oskar Trautmann (1877-1950) were not only important agents in the East Asian political strategies of Nazi Germany in the 1930s as ambassadors in Japan and China, respectively, but also known to have shown strongly contrastive attitudes in their planning and realization of Germany’s diplomatic objectives in Asia. That is, Dirksen supported the negotiations for Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact from the sidelines in Tokyo, thus contributing to the formation of pro-Japanese policy in Nazi Germany’s East Asian policies; on the other hand, Trautmann in China took care to maintain balance in Germany’s policies regarding China and Japan, while continuing to warn against the excessive political and economic commitment of the Nazi government, especially by the Defense and Economics Ministries, to China. In relation to the diplomatic aspect of the Nazi ideology, it can be argued that Dirksen was amicable towards its pro-Japan policies, while Trautman showed a more critical attitude. This difference between the two resulted in their contrastive fates; Dirksen was “promoted” to Ambassador in Britain in February 1938, while Trautmann was ordered home in June 1938 and subsequently given a cold treatment at the Foreign Ministry.
Where does this difference between the two diplomats come from? Primarily, of course, it is a result of the difference between the countries they were dispatched to, China and Japan, in the early years of Nazism; diplomats often attach a great political meaning to the maintenance and development of the amicable relationship between their assigned country and home country, as Morton Halperin has explained using the term “behavioral pattern in the field.” However, Trautmann’s actions cannot be called entirely pro-China, making it difficult to wholly explain it with Halperin’s theory.
The present research plan, therefore, aims to approach this question by focusing on the difference in the cultural background which Dirksen and Trautmann came from. It will be the objective of the research to contrast their attitudes regarding diplomatic policies through analyses of the difference between their social classes (Dirksen came from an aristocratic background, Trautmann from an educated bourgeois one), between their experiences of cultural exchange (Dirksen spent a long period of his career in eastern Europe and Trautmann in east Asia), between their experiences of war, and between their interests in, and understandings of, Asia.
The main documents to be analyzed are as follows: two Dirksen-related documents (10 and 750 centimeters in width) and two Trautmann-related documents (8 and 110 centimeters in width), owned by the Auswärtiges Amt, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, in Berlin, and by the Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde.
Mund, Gerald, Ostasien im Spiegel der deutschen Diplomatie. Die privatdienstliche Korrespondenz des Diplomaten Herbert von Dirksen von 1933 bis 1938, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2006.
Tajima, Nobuo. Nazism Gaiko to “Manshukoku” (Nazi Diplomacy and “Manchukuo”). Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 1992.
---. Nazism Kyokuto Senryaku (Nazi Strategies in the Far East). Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997.
---. Nazis Doitsu to Chugoku Kokumin Seifu 1933-1937 (Nazi Germany and the Nationalist Government of China, 1933-1937). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2013.
First full-scale war against a country in the League of Nations (invasion of a non-Western country by the West)
The National Archives, Kew
Archivio Centrale dello Stato
Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri
As a diplomat and bureaucrat, Charles Hardinge, 1st Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858-1944), Viceroy of India between 1910 and 1916, served in such offices as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and Ambassador to Russia in his 30 years of service since he entered the Office in 1880. Especially favored by King Edward VII (1901-10), Hardinge accompanied the monarch as his right-hand man whenever he travelled overseas, playing an active part on the center stage of European international politics as an agent of the Old Diplomacy.
Immediately following the death of Edward VII, Hardinge assumed the position of Viceroy of India, the highest executive of the “empire within the empire,” the most important colony of the British Empire. Early in his term of office, in December 1911, he successfully administered the coronation ceremony of the Emperor of India, which the King himself attended for the first and last time. On the other hand, during his term of office as Viceroy, general sentiment for independence was already on the rise, while there was also a ceaseless conflict between Hindus and Muslims triggered by the Act of Bengal Partition in 1905. Thus, Hardinge faced various problems which could not be solved by the diplomatic methods and courtesies familiar to him in the field of European international politics.
The present study focuses on the side of Hardinge as a “diplomat” during his term of office as Viceroy of India, which has not been studied in full detail so far; it aims especially to examine the ways in which he strived to govern India and cooperate with his homeland while dealing with the situations in Europe during the Balkan Wars (1912-13) and the First World War (1914-18) and paying special attention to the Muslim population in India, the largest in the world (80 million).
Hardinge Papers, Cambridge University Library.
Edward VII Papers, The Royal Archives, Windsor Castle.
George V Papers, The Royal Archives, Windsor Castle.
Crew Papers, The National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
Grey Papers, The National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old Diplomacy : The Reminiscence of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst（John Murrary, 1947）.
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, My Indian Years, 1910-1916（John Murrary, 1948）.
Kimizuka, Naotaka. George Gosei: Taishuu Minshuseiji Jidai no Kunshu (George V: Monarch in the Age of Mass Democracy). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha,2011.
Kimizuka, Naotaka. Belle Époque no Kokusai Seiji: Edward Nanasei to Kotenkaikou no Jidai (International Politics of Belle Époque: Edward VII and the Age of Old Diplomacy). Tokyo: Chuoukouron Shinsha, 2012.
France’s experience as a pioneer of cultural diplomacy in the early twentieth century illuminates the strengths and limitations of the traditional model and helps us to understand its transformation into public diplomacy. This analysis focuses on the period 1945-1975- covering the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) and De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic.
This was the golden age of France’s global cultural presence. In 1945 France was exhausted, bankrupt, and had extensive war damage from Allied bombing and the fighting of 1940-1944. However, by the mid-1960s the nation emerged as the leader of continental Western Europe. Cultural diplomacy - soft power - played a significant role in this astonishing turnaround -as much a ‘miracle’ as Germany’s wirtschaftswunder.
Reasserting claims to a unique universal voice helped French power in two ways: boosting internal confidence and self –esteem; persuading the United States that France deserved special treatment.
Cultural diplomacy concentrated on renewal and expansion. Re-opening of many institutes and Alliances francaises closed during the war. Additionally, new research centers established like the Maison Francaise, at the University of Oxford, England (1946).
Renewal and expansion operated at three levels:
Key innovations: the most important was the creation of a coordinating agency within the foreign ministry (Quai d’Orsay) Direction generale des relations culturelles et des oeuvres a l’etranger; appointment of cultural advisers at major embassies; bilateral exchanges /agreements; the re-branding of cultural diplomacy –making it a scientific and technological enterprise as well as linguistic, literary and artistic.
France’s cultural diplomacy benefitted from major advantages: strong sense of a unique cultural personality survived 1939-1945 war and German occupation; French values identified with universal values- France perceived itself as a beacon of progress for humanity; legacy of experience gained from early twentieth century leadership in cultural diplomacy.
World War II victors treated France as a great power: Security Council seat; United Nations based in Paris (1946-1951); also UNESCO and NATO.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed in Paris 1948.
Most importantly, three decades from1945-1975 marked a period of exceptional creativity in French intellectual life. Foucault, Derrida and many others impacted profoundly on other cultures, especially on the disciplines of history and critical theory, and humanities generally.
Two other features of French society energized the selling of France
Symbiotic relationship between the state, culture and diplomacy – considerable state funding went to support high culture within France and overseas. In the 1960s half of the foreign ministry’s budget was for the support of cultural diplomacy. France was probably unique in having such a close integration of political, bureaucratic and cultural elites.
Distinguished writers and thinkers pursued public service careers- poet and dramatist PAUL CLAUDEL ambassador to Tokyo in the 1920s.
HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE FOURTH REPUBLIC’S DIPLOMACY?
Lack of money severely restricted the effectiveness of the Fourth Republic’s cultural diplomacy. Underfunding restricted the training of language teachers and limited the number of lecture tours abroad. When novelist Albert Camus undertook a government sponsored lecture tour of American universities in 1946 he had to travel in an overcrowded freighter sharing a cabin with five others.
International perceptions of the Fourth Republic as ‘the sick woman of Europe’ hindered the marketing of French culture. Difficult to make a persuasive case for the superiority of French values when France changed governments every few months.
Lack of funding highlighted tensions between language promotion and projecting culture. Given the small budget, some officials wanted to spend everything on training more language teachers.
World–wide French language was on the defensive. At foundation conference of United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 France only defeated a bid to make English sole working language with the help of Soviet Union and Canada.
General de Gaulle’s commitment to grandeur ensured the success of the Republic’s cultural diplomacy:
1.Interdependence of cultural diplomacy, foreign policy and state power – Cash strapped Fourth republic could do little in early postwar years.
Examples of ALGERIAN WAR and COLD WAR: In Algeria France’s use of torture and carrying out of atrocities conflicted with claim that French values were universal and progressive.
The Cold War excluded a European voice. In the early post-1945 years French leaders envisaged acting as a third force in world politics. In practice, the Soviet Union and the United States removed high politics from Europeans. Moscow and Washington’s management of the Cold War excluded a third force. Medium powers like France and Britain had difficulty finding a distinctive voice.
2.The relentless advance of the English language undercut the primacy of French in diplomacy and as lingua franca among educated elites.
Since eighteenth century French accepted as ‘universal language of law and diplomacy,’ the universality of English contracted space for language work and jeopardized the diffusion of France’s high culture.
3.Convergence of decolonization, globalization, and the cultural revolution of 1960s exposed hollowness of France’s universal cultural claim.
Savage colonial wars in Algeria (use of torture) and Indo-China exposed the hypocrisy of claims to be the guardian of liberal values and human rights.
4.Two domestic developments subverted the standard model of cultural diplomacy.
In the 1970s domestic culture wars erupted – intellectuals contested the state’s universalist claims for high culture; secondly, the changing face of the nation as a result of Muslim immigration, together with the revival of regional identities and local languages like Breton, provoked debates about the nature of French identity. Pierre Nora’s Les Lieux de memoire (1984-1992) reflected the academic discussion. Finally, a highly centralized homogenized state culture had to come to terms with a pluralist multicultural world.
5.1960s accelerated a breakdown of trust in western democracies-between citizens, the state and political leadership.
Cold War propaganda brought a rise in political mendacity, (formal denials in parliament by British ministers of Anglo-Franco-Israeli collusion in Suez affair 1956; United States: Bay of Pigs episode 1961; Gulf of Tonkin incident 1964). State policies and statements fostered public disillusionment and cynicism. Democratic and egalitarian-minded citizens mistrusted elitist projections of national values and culture.
6.After 1970 cultural diplomacy gradually absorbed into the new concept of public diplomacy
Instead of early twentieth century one- way system of selling French values as superior to any other, public diplomacy emphasized a two-way system of cooperation and engagement in a multicultural world.
The career of Hermann Freiherr von Speck von Sternburg (1852-1908) as a diplomat in Wilhelmine Germany is quite remarkable. Originally a Sachsen military officer, he was given cold treatment in the German Foreign Office; most of his assignments were outside Europe, situating him outside the mainstream of diplomatic career at that time. However, his activities in Beijing and Washington were favourably received, allowing him to move up the diplomatic ladder; finally, he was exceptionally promoted to the position of the Ambassador in the United States.
It is not only in terms of his career that von Sternburg stands out. In the era of the “old diplomacy,” he was engaged in the “soft” diplomacy, assimilated himself into the society of his assigned country, and worked on the public opinions of the countries he was assigned to. In the world of German diplomacy at the time, which operated mainly on the customs of the aristocratic society, his conduct was very unusual.
How did his experience with foreign cultures in East Asia and America influence the diplomatic policies of Wilhelmine Germany? The present study aims to answer this question by analysing the activities of Speck von Sternburg in Beijing and Washington D.C., while also paying attention to the transformation of German diplomacy after the resignation of Bismarck.
Rinke, Stefan H., Zwischen Weltpolitik und Monroe Doktrin. Botschafter Speck von Sternburg und diedeutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, 1898-1908, Stuttgart: Han-Dieter Heinz 1992.
Iida, Yosuke. “19seiki Preußen Doitsu no Gaikoukan [Diplomats in the Nineteenth-Century Prussia].” Yoroppa Erito Shihai to Seijibunka [Elitism and Political Culture in Europe]. Ed. Takashi Morihara. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2010. 115-31. [飯田洋介「19世紀プロイセン・ドイツの外交官」森原隆編『ヨーロッパ・エリート支配と政治文化』成文堂 2010, 115-131頁]
In establishing international relations, culture did not take a central role until the end of the Cold War; rather, it remained in the periphery. Due to the development in globalization after the Cold War, as well as the explosion of online population which resulted from developments in information and communication technologies, the importance of soft power came to be recognized; this was one of the reasons why the role of culture in international relations became an object of attention. Especially recently, there has been an increase in the interest in public diplomacy; nations aggressively engage in this type of diplomacy, sometimes even resulting in a form of competition. Tracing back Japanese history, however, it can be observed that culture has played an important role in various historical moments since around the time of the Meiji restoration, long before the ending of the Cold War.
In postwar Japan, too, the element of culture has often been incorporated into the diplomatic policies since immediately after WWII. Especially when the country faced a diplomatic crisis, it would program cultural exchanges and cultural cooperation into its diplomatic policies, sometimes taking hints from the policies of the Western countries.
Examples can be seen in such instances as the changing of the Japanese national image immediately after the war, the campaign against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the “Nixon Shock,” trade conflicts, Japan revisionism, Japan threat theory, the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the U.S. (9.11), and the Great East Japan earthquake. However, postwar Japan never directly linked culture and diplomacy; rather, it insisted on practicing cultural diplomacy as a form of “international cultural exchange.” This suggests that Japan, keeping in mind the pre-war history, strove to encourage the introduction of Japanese culture and personal exchanges in a way that is not too obtrusive. By conducting further research, I hope to analyze how Japanese “international cultural exchange” policies transformed themselves into the present public diplomacy, comparing them with the policies of other countries.
My study focuses on Count Heinrich Coudenhove, who led the Austro-Hungarian legation in Tokyo between 1893 and 1896, and his view of Meiji Japan around the time of the Sino-Japanese War. In his reports, memoranda and private correspondence, Coudenhove gave vivid first-hand accounts of Japan standing at the threshold of modern statehood, and predicted its subsequent rise to the status of a major power.
Japan in the 1890s stood at a critical juncture of its history. Forced to open the country under the pressure of the U.S. and the European powers, Japan underwent a series of wide-ranging reforms, which culminated in the introduction of a western-style Constitution in 1889 and the opening of the National Diet in 1890. Coudenhove admired the courage and determination of Hirobumi Ito, the creator of the constitutional system in Japan, but remained deeply skeptical of its future viability.
Indeed, practicing constitutionalism in a country imbued with traditional sense of social order was no easy task. A majority of the Lower House Deputies in 1893 was clearly hostile to the government, and called for immediate expulsion of foreigners as well as the revision of unequal treaties. Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, Ito’s close ally, addressed the House on December 29th, urging the members to stay on the course toward progress and civilization. The epoch-making speech by Mutsu met Coudenhove’s unqualified approval.
Japan faced new challenges in relations with its neighbors as well. Korea had been a vassal state of China in the centuries-old tribute system. Japan, on the other hand, insisted on the status of Korea as an independent state, supporting the latter’s effort to modernize itself. In 1884, however, pro-Chinese factions in Korea defeated the pro-Japanese reformers, dashing Japan’s hope to ensure Korean neutrality.
In Coudenhove’s view, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was a conflict between two different types of international order. It was a war between forces of civilization on the one hand, and forces of backwardness and barbarism on the other. In one of his reports dated December 1894, Japan, a rising nation-state, was compared to Ancient Greece, while China was likened to Persia, the declining Empire that was to be defeated by the Hellenes.
On May 17, 2015, the 65th annual conference of the Japanese Society of Western History was held at Toyama University (Gofuku Campus), where four members of our research group gave presentations at the Small Symposium 2 “Cultural Exchange and Transformation of Modern Diplomacy.” The summary of their presentations is as follows:
“Public diplomacy” or “culture politics,” a diplomatic strategy in which a country aims to control the international opinion by communicating its culture to the outside world, is becoming an important element in foreign policies not only of western countries but also of Asian countries including Japan and China.
Historically, culture has played a crucial role in international relations. In the heyday of “Old Diplomacy” after the Vienna Conference, the linguistic and cultural homogeneity, centered on the French language, of European educated classes enabled them to achieve a “balance of power” through the post-Congress Vienna System, albeit temporarily. On the other hand, diplomats and administrators commissioned from European countries to such remote areas as Asia, Africa and South America found it necessary to understand foreign languages, cultures and religious traditions as well as to conduct their diplomatic activities and colonial administration while being mindful of local customs. As a result, it became imperative that the classical Eurocentric diplomatic ideals be reconsidered; in the time of the “New Diplomacy” after World War I, governments competed against each other in their organized cultural propagandas, leading the way to post-war cultural diplomacy.
This symposium focuses on the roles of “cultural encounters” experienced by Europeans who were sent to non-Christian countries in the “frontier,” aiming to make an international comparison among four different countries: Britain, France, Austria-Hungary and Germany. Each of the reports analyzes the cultural activities and colonial policies developed by the diplomat or colonial administrator of one of the four countries, sometimes from his own personal interest and sometimes by the instruction of his home government.
It is well known that the Elgin Marbles and the Rosetta Stone in the British Museum were collected through the use of British diplomatic and military power; however, there are not many researches which shed light on the specific details of the negotiation and transportation processes through which these cultural artifacts arrived at the Museum or their relations with the diplomatic policies at the time. The present report focuses on the Mesopotamian cultural heritage in the British Museum, with special attention paid to the activities of the diplomat Henry Austen Layard, who discovered such artifacts as the human-headed winged bulls and established the collection. Layard also contributed to collecting the Renaissance paintings at the National Gallery. In nineteenth-century Britain, the notable characters in the political/diplomatic field were often connected to, and sometimes identical with, the people involved with the museums; therefore, the present research will explore how the establishment of the museum collections and the diplomatic policies were interconnected. Primary sources include the manuscripts in the British Museum archives and the minutes of meetings in the National Gallery archive.
In October 1858, France signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (one of the five Ansei Treaties) with Japan, establishing diplomatic relations with the country, as it was gaining new military and commercial bases in Asia as a result of its newly strengthened power in the Far East, resulting mainly from the Opium War. After signing the treaty, the French imperial government began to send full-time diplomatic representatives to Japan; Duchesne de Bellecourt was assigned to the post, immediately followed by Roches.
To the French government, especially to the diplomat assigned to Japan, the diplomatic relations to the country also meant an encounter with an unknown foreign culture. What sort of diplomatic system did France use in order to build and maintain its relations with Japan? How did the diplomatic representatives in Japan observe the country, and what enabled them to accomplish their missions? Based on the historical records in the French Foreign Office and focusing on the functions of diplomatic representatives as they faced a foreign culture, the present report aims to approach the specific details of cross-cultural experiences in French diplomacy with Japan and to consider some of the questions concerning the imperial diplomacy in the Far East.
The present report suggests a possibility for “cultural understanding” of Asian countries including Japan through the example of Heinrich Coudenhove, who was assigned in Japan as the Austro-Hungarian Deputy Minister for four years since the spring of 1892. Eijiro, the second son of Heinrich and the Japanese Mitsu Aoyama, would later become Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the leader of the Pan-European movement. In previous research, therefore, Heinrich has mainly been mentioned as the husband of Mitsuko and father of Richard; little light has been shed on his activities and achievements as a diplomat. By reading his reports to the Foreign Office, stored in the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, and the correspondence to family members and other documents in the “Coudenhove Family Papers” stored at the Plzeň Regional Archive, Czech Republic, the present report discusses Heinrich Coudenhove’s perspective toward Japan and other parts of the non-Western world, as well as his communications with such diplomatic leaders of the Sino-Japanese War period as Munemitsu Mutsu and Hirobumi Ito.
Wilhelm Solf came to Tokyo after the end of World War I as Ambassador in Japan, after serving consecutively as Governor of German Samoa, Secretary of the German Colonial Office, and Foreign Minister. He is known for his knowledge of, as well as his sympathies towards, Japan; he is also known as one of the leading figures of the culture politics of the 1920s. In his later years, Solf confronted Hitler’s regime and formed an opposition group to the Nazis; however, he died of illness in 1936. Solf’s experience as Governor of Samoa helped the formation of his theories regarding colonial government, which also influenced Japanese colonial policies.
In the mid-nineteenth century, as the western powers came into Samoa, the population of so-called “mixed” or “half-caste” people increased. Because of the greater demand for labor under the German rule, many Chinese people emigrated to Samoa as seasonal workers. The present report discusses Solf’s policies regarding the legal status of the mixed-race children and the Chinese workers; it also focuses on the process in which the social standings of these mixed-race children and Chinese workers were projected onto the social hierarchy as well as the religious and political differences among the German people.